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In debates over the conditions for a jusr world order, one hears
frequent appeals to Kant's call for states to unite in a federation.'
Given the force of Kane's arguments and their influence on the shape
of such institutions as the League of Nations and the United Nations,
this is certainly justified. But an essential part of what Kant saw as
necessary for a global legal order is usua l ly neglected. What is over-
looked is Kant's emphasis on the status of individuals under what lie
calls 'cosmopolitan law'.2 Cosmopolitan law is concerned not with
the interaction between states, but with the status of individuals in
their dealings with states of which they are not citizens. Moreover, it
is concerned with the status of individuals as human beings, rather
than as citizens of states. In Kant's political theory, cosmopolitan law
(Welibiirgerrecht) is the third category of public law, in addition to
constitutional law and international law.3 Its core is what Kant calls a
right to hospitality. He argues that states and individuals have the
right to attempt to establish relations with other states and their
citizens, but not a right to enter foreign territory. States have the right
to refuse visitors, but not violently, and not if it leads to their
destruction. This implies an obligation to refrain from imperialist
intrusions and to provide safe haven for refugees.
Kant's concept of cosmopolitan law merits all the more attention
because it illuminates recent changes in the status of individuals
under international law. This status has been strengthened
significantly in this century, but the importance of rhe development
has not been sufficiently recognized in political theory.
In this essay, I argue that Kant's concept of cosmopolitan law not
only represents a more important part of Kant's political theory than
is usually acknowledged but also provides an interesting Kantian
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grounding for several twentieth-century developments in inter-
national law. I first discuss Kant's view as to the addressees, content,
and justification of cosmopolitan law. I subsequently focus on the
problem of its institutionalization. I argue that despite problems with
how lie works it out, Kant's idea of reserving theoretical space for a
third level of public law in addition to constitutional and inter-
national law is sound. Moreover, it can be developed into a position
chat is relevant to contemporary issues/
One might wonder why Kant's concept of cosmopolitan law has
been neglected for so long. In the literature, Kant's ideas about
international law and the league of nations have always received much
more attention than what he has to say about cosmopolitan law. This
is also true of the current wave of writings on Perpetual Peace. I think
this neglect can be explained by several factors. On the one hand, the
scope of cosmopolitan law seems to be rather limited. In Perpetual
Peace, where Kant introduces it, it appears in a prominent position, as
the third definitive article. Compared to the weighty first and second
articles, however, it seems almost negligible, or even a mere part of the
second. It certainly does not seem to deserve the same amount of
attention as the other two articles.5
At a superficial level, moreover, what Kant says about cosmopolitan
law seems rather obvious today. Few would dispute that states should
not treat visiting foreigners hostilely, or that one should have the right
to travel and to attempt to establish international communication, be
it commercial, cultural, or political, without having the right to enter
or settle in the territory of others without their consent. In the times
of slave trade, colonization, and highwaymen, these may have been
controversial claims. And until the early twentieth century, Kant was
regularly criticized for failing to adequately recognize the so-called
'cultural mission' of European states vis-à-vis 'savages'.6 But at the
end of this century, we seem to take Kant's claims about the content
of cosmopolitan law for granted.
Finally, a more philosophical reason for its neglect may be the
conviction that the concept of cosmopolitan law faces the following
fatal dilemma: Either it is a superfluous category, and its content can
simply be subsumed under internat ional law; or, if it is to be a distinct
category, it cannot be institutionalized without presupposing the kind
of world republicanism that Kant rejects. Jn order to show the
relevance of Kant's notion of cosmopolitan law, it is necessary to
show that this is a faise dilemma. I shall argue that the distinction
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between international and cosmopolitan law can be defended and
that die latter can be institutionalized, at least to a degree, without
embracing the ideal of a single world republic. In the course of this
discussion it will also become clear that Kant's conception of
cosmopolitan law is by no means an insignificant appendage. Indeed,
it is decidedly relevant to recent developments in international law.
Kant's Cosmopolitan Law: Its Addressees, Content and
Justification
Addressees
As early as 181)0, Wilhehn Traugott Krug formulated the following
abjection:
Cosmopolitan law, which people have recently introduced as a distinct part
of public law, is really only a part of international law, or rather one single
problem of the latter, a problem that is important enough, but thai does
not deserve to be listed under a title of its own, as if it were a separate
part.'
At first sight, Krug seems to have a point. After all, ic is states, not
individuals, who make treaties tegarding ambassadors, trade
agreements, and the like, it seems that international interaction falls
under international law and that nothing warrants inventing a new
sphere of public law.
For Kant, however, the answer lies in the difference in addressees
between international and cosmopolitan law. According to the
traditional view, shared by Kant, international law is the law between
states. By contrast, in cosmopolitan law, 'individuals and states, who
stand in an external relationship of mutual influence, are regarded as
citizens of a universal state of humankind (allgemeiner Menschen-
slaat) (ius cosmopoliticum)' (PP 8: 349n.)-8 In the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant mentions nations and 'citizens of the earth' (Ereburger)
(MM 6: 353) as bearers of cosmopolitan rights.' Thus cosmopolitan
law addresses states and individuals, addtessing individuals as
'citizens of the earth' rather than as citizens of a particular state.
Independently of their nationality, all humans are world citizens.10
This answers Krug's objection and warrants drawing a distinction
between international law and cosmopolitan law, at least as long as
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one conceives of international law as law between states, which is how
it has traditionally been conceived. Before addressing the problem of
the institutionalization of cosmopolitan law, I must say more about its
contents and Kant's justification.
Content
Cosmopolitan law is concerned with interaction (Verkehr) across
borders. It covers any kind of communication, interaction, trade, ot
business. It applies to travel, migration, intellectual exchange, as well
as to commercial endeavours."
The content of cosmopolitan law is the right to hospitality:
'Cosmopolitan law shall be limited to the conditions of universal
hospitality' (PP 8: 357). Kant employs a minimal and negative concept
of hospitality, as 'the right of a stranger not to be treated with
hostility because of his arrival on someone else's soil' (PP 8: 358). It is
merely a right to visit, which Kant understands as the right to present
oneself and to try to establish contacts with people and states in other
parts of the world. Thus, despite the term 'hospitality right', it is
emphatically not a right to be treated as a guest, A state has the right
to deny a visit, as long as it does so non-violently. And individuals
have the right to present themselves, not the right actually to visit
with others, since the others ate free to decline the request (MM 6:
352). As Kant puts it in Perpetual Peace: it is a right to 'approach', not
to 'entry' (Zwgtf'ig not Emgrmg) (PP 8: 359). Visitors do not have a
general right to be supported, to be taken in, or to be tolerated by a
foreign state any longer than it takes them to turn around and leave.
National sovereignty sets limits to the travelling world citizen.12
Finally, no one has a right to settle on the soil of another people; this
right can only be established through a treaty. Kant's targets are
obvious: much of his treatment of cosmopolitan law is a strong
critique of colonialism.
Incidentally, the fact that Kant mentions that one can only settle in
land already occupied or used through a treaty is interesting given the
intellectual climate of the time. Kant stands out amidst eighteenth-
century philosophers who discuss the question whether one needed to
or even could have, tteaties with people who had not yet formed a
state, and whether 'savages' are capable of forming treaties in the first
place. Kant here not only grounds his diffetent view in his theory of
property rights, which, in contrast to Lockean approaches, allows him
to say that nomads have a rightful claim to land. He also affirms that
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anyone, whether Brit or 'Hottentot', is the potential subject of
covenants, and the bearer of certain basic rights.33
Limiting its content to hospitality rights seems to make
cosmopolitan law very limited indeed. But it has broader implications
than one expects at first. Whether or not he intends it, Kant does
defend a right that under certain circumstances is even broader than a
right to political asylum, including protection from starvation or fatal
disease. He argues that a state may refuse a visitor only 'when it can
happen without his destruction' (Untergang, PP 8: 358). This principle
has significant implications. When refusing a person at the border is
impossible without the person being killed, admission is obligatory.
And one cannot legitimately send a person back to a country where
she or he will die or be killed as a result of being sent back. Kant
dtaws this implication himself in a draft for Perpetual Peace, mention-
ing that people who are forced by circumstances outside their control
to arrive on another state's territory should be allowed to stay at least
until the circumstances are favourable for their return. He gives the
examples of shipwreck victims washed ashore and of sailors on a ship
seeking refuge from a storm in a foreign harbour, thus in effect stating
that cosmopolitan law implies the right to a safe haven (23: 173}. Kant
here anticipates many of the refugee rights that were established in the
twentieth century.1 '4
Kant's view that states have the right to reject visitors for any
reason unless it causes their destruction raises the question of whether
this does not make cosmopolitan law too restrictive. Hot example,
would it be permissible for a state to turn away requests for political
asylum on the grounds that, if returned, the applicant faces torture or
imprisonment but not a certain death? And are states free to reject
foreigners on racist grounds? Kant himself does not address these
issues, but they are clearly issues that must be addressed in a defence
of his notion of cosmopolitan law. In discussing this lacuna in Kant's
account, it is important to emphasize that he was primarily concerned
with limiting the rights of colonialist aggressors. Foremost on his
mind were European states bent on taking possession of land overseas
without any regard for the claims of the native population. In limiting
foreigners' claims to access, he is aiming to support the sovereignty of
indigenous peoples against unwanted European encroachment.
Kant could, however, easily have anticipated today's questions
regarding the precise scope of refugee rights. The eighteenth century
was familiar enough with the phenomenon of refugees, and the
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treatment of some groups of refugees, for example Jews, often did not
meet Kant's standard. But on the basis of what Kant says about
cosmopolitan law, it is possible to develop an answer to the questions
posed above. Two points are central here. First, Kant's term
Untergang, rendered as 'destruction', could be interpreted more
broadly than referring to death only. It could conceivably also include
mental destruction or incapacitating physical harm, in which case the
range of cases to which it applies would be much greater. Second,
Kant's theory of cosmopolitan law has some room for limits on the
range of legitimate reasons for rejection. It would seem that
discriminatory rules that keep groups of foreigners out by law just
because they have a certain skill colour disregard these foreigners'
right to present themselves and to try to establish contact. If they will
be rejected a priori, regardless of who they are or what they have to
offer or ask, their right to attempt to establish contact is empty.
This should not be taken to imply that states are not allowed to
make any laws that exclude certain categories of foreigners from
entering. Kant himself supports the Chinese and Japanese in their
attempt to keep European traders at a distance. What Kant would
need here is a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate reasons
for keeping certain groups out. Arguably, such a distinction could be
drawn in terms of whether or not the exclusionary law or policy
respects the rights of others, and whether its criteria are relared to the
actions and proposals of the foreigner rather than being based on an
arbitrary, irrelevant characteristic. For example, a law that discrimin-
ates on the basis of skin colour would be illegitimate, while a law that
forbids persons from entering the country to sell opium would not.
While opium salespersons should be allowed to request entry, it is
within the right of states to send them away because of their specific
plans. The line between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for
rejection may be quite hard to draw in practice, and as with any legal
principle, there will be hard cases when it comes to applying it. But
the important point here is that Kant is not necessarily committed to
the position that any ground for rejection will do.
Justification
Kant grounds cosmopolitan law in the 'original community of the
land', that is in the idea that before any particular acquisition of
property, the earth is in common possession. After such acquisition,
others no longer have a rightful claim to use or occupy what is mine,
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and in the case of national territory this means that when a people has
a r ightful claim to the use and property of their land, foreigners do
not, except when expressly permitted. But all parts of the earth, Kant
says, continue to be thought of as parts of the whole to which every-
one had an original right. This, he claims, implies that all nations
stand in a community of possible physical interaction (MM 6: 352).
This argument provides at best a partial grounding for cosmo-
politan law, however. The original community of the land may ground
a right to be in those parts that do not belong to anyone yet, and the
status of unclaimed spaces is indeed an important issue covered by
cosmopolitan law. In Perpetual Peace, for example, Kant says that
ships and camels may make it possible for humans from different
parts of the earth to 'approach each other over these ownerless areas,
and to utilize as a means of social interaction that right to the surface,
which the human race hulds in common' (PP 8: 358).
But Kant also thinks that the original community of the land some-
how grounds the validity of cosmopolitan law in areas that are
acquired. Yet his argument is terse and its structure is not immediately
clear. For what exactly is the relevance of the idea of an original com-
mon possession of land? In his 1798 commentary to Kant's Doctrine
of Right, Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk attempts to explicate what
remains implicit in Kant's brief justification of cosmopolitan law.
On Tieftrunk's reconstruction, the fact that the earth must be
thought of as originally in common possession means that even
though it is divided up into parcels of land which have become private
property, everyone must regard land owned by others as in principle
acquirable. To deny a person the right to acquire any property from,
anyone else means as much as to say
You are not a human being at all, you have originally no equal right to be
on the eacih with others, you are not in original common possession of the
entire soil and its things . . . You arc a being which is not even entitled to
the thought that something that ! have could become yours.IJ
Tieftrunk argues that the hospitality right follows from the fact that
the condition of the possibility of such acquisition is interaction, and
the condition of the possibility of interaction is that one is allowed to
present oneself to initiate interaction.16
Even if Kant were to endorse this reconstruction, however, it svill
does not suffice to ground cosmopolitan law to the fu l l extent. For in
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interpreting the right to hospitality as the right to try to acquire other
people's property, regardless of national botders, Tieftrunk provides
a justification for only part of what is covered under cosmopolitan
law. If all attempts at cosmopolitan interaction would have to be seen
as attempts to start negotiations about property transactions, not
even the cases mentioned by Kant himself, such as shipwreck victims
washed ashore and sailors seeking a safe haven from a storm, would
be covered. Thus, we need a fur ther account of why strangers have a
right not to be treated with hostility upon their arrival on foreign
territory.
Kant could have developed such an account straight from the
original, innate human right to freedom, however.17 This is a right
that is not acquired but belongs to every human being by birth alone.
It is the right to 'freedom {independence from the coercive choice of
another), in so far as it can coexist with the fteedom of every other in
accordance with a universal law' (MM 6: 237). It includes 'innate
equality, that is the independence from being bound by others to
more than one can in turn bind them' (MM 6: 237). This innate right
to freedom applies to what is 'internally mine or yours', that is, a
person's mental and physical faculties in so far as these can be
influenced by others (MM 6: 238). The innate right to freedom also
includes, as Kant mentions elsewhere in the Metaphysics of Morals,
the 'right to be there where nature or chance (without [one's] will) has
placed (one)' (MM 6: 262). In the unpublished draft for the Doctrine
of Right Kant motivates this by saying that being on land is necessary
for the very existence of human beings, and thus, that people have a
right to be on the land on which they are placed through no choice of
their own, since denying them this right would mean denying them
their existence and their fteedom (23: 318)."
The innate human right to freedom is all one needs to back up the
principle of hospitality. For this right implies precisely the two aspects
central to Kant's understanding of the hospitality principle: that
prospective visitors have no right to intrude into the sphere of free-
dom of others against their will, and that neither states nor
individuals have the right to refuse visitors when this would lead to
the annihilation of their freedom (their destruction).
Further support for the claim that Kant's doctrine of cosmopolitan
law is best grounded on his notion of the innate right to freedom can
be found in the comments that he makes in the section in which he
introduces this right. Here Kant says it implies the tight 'to do to
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others anything that docs not in itself diminish what is theits, so long
as they do not want to accept it' (MM 6: 238). As an example, he
mentions communicating one's thoughts to others, It is up to them
whether to accept what is being said, thereby perhaps incurring false
beliefs. By extension, one can derive a right to present oneself to
others and request entry, interaction, exchange, etc., which still leaves
the addressees at liberty to refuse the request. One does not diminish
their freedom by trying.
A special problem is posed by the fact that granting refugee status
to a person seems to entitle him or her to deprive others of their
external property rights, against their will. The stranger's staying on
land owned by others seems to 'diminish what is theirs'. After all, to
own an object means that one is wronged if one is disturbed in the use
of the object by someone else, regardless of whether one physically
holds the object (cf. MM 6: 245-57). Therefore, the injunction to let
the stranger use a piece of land, even if it is as small as the space
needed for a body, seems an infringement upon the property rights of
its owners. In this way, a conflict would seem to emerge between
claims founded on the innate right to freedom and claims founded on
property rights, thus showing Kant's doctrine of cosmopolitan law to
be inconsistent with his theory of private law.
One could of course try to solve this problem by pointing out that
foreigners do not acquire any properry when they are entitled to the
temporary enjoyment of other people's property, say, of a foreign
harbour in a storm, or a shore on which they are shipwrecked. Also,
Kant does not say that the visitors must be given any goods, such as
food, for free. While both points are true, however, they do not fully
address the problem, because they do not solve the difficulty that
foreigners still interfere with the right of the properry owner to
determine how and by whom the property is used.
I would like to argue, however, that the requirements of cosmo-
politan law and the principles of private law can be reconciled. In his
discussion of constitutional law, Kant mentions a case that is in some
interesting respects analogous to the case at hand. He argues that a
government has the right to impose taxes on the people in order to
provide for the poor and for foundling homes (MM 6: 326). He
justifies this by saying that the state is founded on the general will of
the people (as a rational idea, not an empirical reality), and that the
people unite themselves into a commonwealth under the rule of law in
order to ensure that those members of society who are not able to
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maintain themselves will be maintained with the help of the state.
Therefore, the state has a right to tax the wealthy (who themselves
benefit from the protection of the state, too) on behalf of the susten-
ance of their co-citizens.
In cosmopolitan law, 'individuals and states, who stand in an
external relationship of mutual influence, are regarded as citizens of a
universal state of humankind' (see above, p.74). This makes it possible
to draw an analogy between the justification of the imposition of
taxes by the state and that of the legal requirement to let foreigners
use parts of one's territory in the case here at issue. Those who own
territory on which foreigners arrive due to forces beyond their control
can then be required under cosmopolitan law to let foreigners use pa r t
of their property if this is necessary for their survival. Obviously, in
his discussion of taxation Kant goes much fur ther than in his defence
of the right to a safe haven. He does not ask for a world-wide taxation
system or argue that there is a legal requirement to give up part of
one's property for the benefit of strangers, but only implies that they
should be able to use it temporarily, if this is necessary for their
continued existence. But for present purposes what is important is
that Kant does envision at least one other situation in which property
owners are legally obliged to give up some rights to their property in
order to provide for the sustenance of someone whose existence
would be endangered otherwise.
The Problem of Institutionalization
Kant says virrually nothing about the institutionalization of
cosmopolitan law. There are two questions here. The first question is
what form coercion could take. This is important because Kant sees
Recht (rights, rightful law) and the use of necessary coercion as two
sides of the same coin (MM 6: 231-2). The lack of enforcement
possibilities would seem to put the very designation Recht Welt-
hürgerrecht (cosmopolitan law) at peril. The second question
concerns what cosmopolitan citizenship consists in, particularly,
whether humans and states can self-legislate cosmopolitan law. It
seems that they would have to have a hand in framing cosmopolitan
law in some way, if Kant is to avoid paternalism. Both questions point
to the problem that either cosmopolitan law is not public law in any
literal sense, or Kant must be sneaking in some kind of world
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republicanism. Given that Kant barely addresses these issues, to
answer these questions involves going beyond Kant's own writings.
But I will show that one can develop a modified Kantian account on
the basis of his own principles. I begin with the problem of coercion.
Coercion
As it stands, Kant's theory provides no way of solving the problem of
enforcement and coercion. He rejects the very possibility of trans-
na t iona l enforcement of international law, which makes it impossible
to draw on his discussion of in terna t ional law in order to solve the
problem of the enforcement of cosmopolitan law. Moreover, the
section on the 'spirit of trade', which lie calls the 'guarantee1 of
cosmopolitan law (PP 8: 365), provides no solution. Briefly put, his
argument there goes as follows. Monetary greed will encourage states
to promote peace, since trade makes money, making money is in the
m u t u a l interest of all states, and peace is more hospitable to trade
than war. Promoting peace requires negotiations, which means inter-
na t iona l interaction, which is what cosmopolitan law is all about (PP
8:368),
This is no real solution, however, since there is nothing in the pur-
suit of commercial gam as such that implies that hospitality rights for
ail humans (not just sales representatives, but also philosophers,
tourists, refugees, and others) will be the inevitable spin-off. The
interaction between the United States and the People's Republic of
China provides a current example. China does not let ail of its citizens
travel abroad freely, which means that the cosmopolitan rights of
many are violated. But neither on the US side nor on the Chinese side
is the spirit of trade sufficient to change this situation. Nor does it
prevent China from treating non-commercial foreign visitors hostilely
(as some say happened during the recent United Nations conference
on the status of women). Nor did the spirit of trade protect North
Korean refugees from being sent back by China to face a certain
death. Mutual commercial interests do seem to provide an incentive to
the US and China to preserve peace and commercial interaction. But
it does nor do enough to guarantee hospitality rights for everyone.
Thus, other mechanisms than trade are needed to guarantee cosmo-
politan rights universally.
Jf one wants to take cosmopolitan law li terally as public law, taking
seriously the designation 'right' in 'cosmopolitan rights' and assum-
ing that rights and the possibility of coercion belong together, one
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must reject Kant's claim that transnational enforcement is neither
desirable nor possible. But this daim of Kant's has a problematic
status in light of his general theory that rights and coercion belong
together, and thus, rejecting it allows for a more consistent Kantian
position. Several authors have recently shown that Kant's position on
the institutionalization of international law is inconsistent and un-
necessary, and that ilis own principles should have led him to advocate
the formation of a transnational body of states with limited coercive
powers." Moreover, Kant's quite uncharacteristic claim that we
should opt for a loose confederation of states because states will never
want to join a transnational body with coercive powers (PP 8: 357) has
to a large extent been falsified by twentieth-century developments.
To say that Kant's theory is compatible with enforcement of
cosmopolitan law is not yet to specify what form a transnational body
should take that guarantees cosmopolitan rights, and this, then, is the
next question. I do not answer this question in full, but I point to one
possible answer, suggested by twentieth-century history.
Traditionally, individuals appear as the subjects of rights in
international law only in so far as they are citizens of states, that is, in
virtue of their nationality. In the case of disputes, individuals must
appeal for protection to a national legal order (either their own or a
foreign one), without having access to transnational levels of appeals.
Moreover, states were granted sovereignty and - as also laid down in
the Charter of the United Nations - freedom from interference with
their internal affairs. This gave state sovereigns a pretext, if not
authorization, to deal with their subjects as they saw fit. But in this
century, in part in reaction to vast abuses of this principle, the status
of individuals in international law has been strengthened. As Alfred
Verdross and Bruno Simma put it:
The newest developments in international law have broken up the absolute
subjection of people to the state. Not only does [he content of an ever grow-
ing number of treaties in international law serve the interests of individual
humans or certain groups, but individuals are also being elevated
immediately to bearers of rights under international law, and tliey are put in
a position to assert these rights at the level of international law thetnselves.10
These new rights are not tied to a particular nationality on the part of
the individual. The improved legal status of refugees can serve as an
example. Central to the treaties resulting from the 1951 Geneva
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convention21 is the prohibition against refusing or deporting refugees
if that endangers them for reasons of their religion, race, political
views, or membership in a certain social group. It does not apply to
endangermem in the form of hunger and poverty or disease, nor does
it extend to a positive right to receive asylum; one can request asylum,
but the decision is still left to the sovereign states. Nevertheless,
persons endangered for any of the reasons firsr mentioned are legally
protected regardless of their nationality.
individuals not only have new rights, but can also be held
responsible for crimes under international law, even when their actions
are legal within their own state and their state has not signed treaties
excluding such behaviour. Examples are the delicta iuns gentium, such
as slave trade, genocide, terrorism, many of which have been the
subject of treaties since the 1970s.12 In many cases, individual states are
authorized by international law to try persons who are accused of such
crimes. In other cases, international tribunals provide some means of
implementation. So far, such tribunals have been instituted ad hoc, but
proposals for a permanent international criminal court are being
discussed. Although effectiveness and consistency of its enforcement
leave much to be desired, it is important to realize that in such cases
international law cuts through the shield of state sovereignty, creating
a new level of legal responsibility for individuals.
This is a significant shift in the paradigm of international law. From
being limited to regulating the relations between Christian sovereigns,
its scope was broadened until it included all states, and then further to
include international organizations such as the Red Cross. The fact
that now individual human beings are designated as subjects of
international law is another big step. In effect, international law now
includes the category of rights that Kant subsumed under the title of
cosmopolitan law.
International law has in some respects broadened the scope of
individual rights beyond the 'limits' Kant set for cosmopolitan law in
the third definitive article in Perpetual Peace. But many of these newer
developments are compatible with his views. For example, as I
indicated earlier, one can derive a strong notion of refugee rights from
Kant's writings. Moreover, the ' l imits ' he set were meant to limit the
rights of colonial powers rather than the further development of
individual rights.
Enforcement is currently limited and inconsistent, but it exists. It is
affected by the unequal distribution of money and power between
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states, in a way that Kant failed to foresee. The institutionalization and
implementation of cosmopolitan law ultimately depend on states, and
differences in their power and money influence their willingness to
work together and pay the expenses of the institution. Thus, there are
no guarantees that the developments mentioned will continue, and the
fate of cosmopolitan law depends largely on whether its implementa-
tion coincides with the interests of the powers that be.
But what is important here is that in practice it has become possible
to distinguish, in addition to legal agreements regarding states and
their citizens, other agreements that invest individuals us individuals
with rights and responsibilities. If one wanted to recognize this
change by giving the second kind its own name, the term 'cosmo-
politan law' would be quite proper.
Citizenship
There is reason to think that even under cosmopolitan law, states have
fuller citizenship status than individuals. After all, in tbe absence of a
world government, only states and international organizations sign
agreements, and it is their representatives who negotiate the terms, not
individuals qua individuals.23 But the notion of cosmopolitan citizen-
ship of individuals gains more substance when one realizes that in
democracies, individuals can co-legislate indirectly, by electing repres-
entatives who do so directly, ïn a parallel fashion, one can conceive of
cosmopolitan law as indirectly democratic, and the term 'citizen' in
'world citizen' does not have to be read merely metaphorically, if those
who determine cosmopolitan law are democratically elected represent-
atives who are ultimately accountable to their constituents.
Moreover, individuals can exercise citizenship through engaging in
public deliberation in a global network of overlapping public spheres.
Kant recognizes the world historical importance of the fact that a
violation of human rights in one place is 'felt in every place on earth'
(PP 8: 360). He also sees a tight connection between citizenship and
leiation." This invites uspublii elop hi:
sphere a little further than he did himself, and apply them to the
cosmopolitan level.25
More advanced means of communication provide the material
conditions for a' global public sphere. There is world-wide political,
scientific, and cultural interaction, ranging from internet groups to
large-scale United Nations conferences, to scholarly and scientific co-
operation. Forums such as these, combined with a hospitable culture
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at the national level, can form the cultural seedbed for transnational
political initiatives supporting cosmopolitan rights,
Again, there is no guarantee. "While some barriers get broken down,
others become more prominent. The existing economic and political
inequalities between rich and poor, both within states and between
states, still form a massive obstacle to the realization of equal cosmo-
politan citizenship of all. For example, the internet is wonderful for
allowing people far apart to get in touch and exchange information
and ideas. But if the infrastructure in one's country does not support
it, one cannot afford a computer, is illiterate, or does not speak the
dominant language, one is now further behind than before.
This example should also serve to warn against easy equations of
market globalization with a global increase in cosmopolitan citizen-
ship. The global spread of capitalism and its products, say, a
US-based hamburger chain, does not per se lead to an increased
realization of cosmopolitan rights of individual human beings."
"What is necessary for the realization of cosmopolitan rights are not so
much economic, but political initiatives and guarantees.
liut one does not need a world state, in the sense of a single
political siate absorbing all currently existing states, in order to
conceive of the possibility of the realization of cosmopolitan law to
some degree. Less radical forms of transnational institutions can also
give meaning to refugee rights. Thus, we should not be more
pessimistic than the current state of the world forces us to be. Given
the legal changes made in this century - often prompted, it must be
said, by horrendous crimes — we can stdl say, with Kant, that 'the idea
of a cosmopolitan law is not fantastic and overstrained' {PP 8: 360),
because it is possible to give a Kantian account of the institutional-
izatiori of cosmopolitan law, at least to a degree.
In this paper I have argued that Kant's category of cosmopolitan law
is neither superfluous nor metaphorical and that it is an appropriate
category for conceptualizing the changes that have taken place within
international law regarding the status of persons. Thus, the import-
ance of cosmopolitan law, both within Kant's political theory and as a
theme in the current discussion about cosmopolitanism> should no
longer be underestimated.
Kant is a cosmopolitan of a moderate cast. His view is considerably
less radical than proposals to overthrow the nation-state system, and
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his concept of cosmopolitan law, when taken in isolation from the rest
of his political philosophy, is compatible with a range of views
regarding what political bodies the world should contain. It is
compatible with different views on this issue, as long as they provide
for a level of public law at which humans have certain basic human
rights as 'citizens of thé world', rather than as members of any
particular lower-level political body.
Yet, even this moderate cosmopolitanism is quite radical. How to
institutionalize cosmopolitan rights fully in a world in which eco-
nomic, political, and other inequalities make it impossible to
guarantee their protection is a difficult question. I do not claim to
have answered this question here, but I have shown that it is at least
not impossible to conceive of an institutionalization to some degree.27
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